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Abstract  
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during 
the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription 
period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are 
closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the 
bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the under-
pricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are 
much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.  
 
JEL classification: G10, G14, G24 
Keywords: Initial public offerings, underpricing, when-issued trading, asymmetric information, 
winner’s curse, information production Introduction 
The underpricing of initial public offerings has been the subject of intensive theoretical and em-
pirical research and yet still represents a puzzle. At the heart of the puzzle is the question of who 
knows what, and when. Do informed investors know more about the firm value than the issuer and 
the underwriter (as is assumed by, e.g., Rock (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989))? Does the 
underwriter know more than the issuer (as in the principal agent models of Baron and Holmström 
(1980), Baron (1982))? Does the issuer have superior knowledge about the firm value but volun-
tarily chooses to underprice (as is assumed in the signaling models of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989))? Or is underpricing a means of creating excess de-
mand, which can be desirable even if information is symmetric (as in the optimal ownership struc-
ture models of Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998))?  
Finding an answer to these questions is complicated by the fact that there is usually no price history 
before an IPO. In Germany, by contrast, there is an active market for pre-issue trades in initial pub-
lic offerings. In compliance with German financial regulation, broker-dealers offer OTC pre-issue 
trading for investors who want to buy or sell shares during the bookbuilding period. The price 
range is not bounded by the bookbuilding spread or any other limits. The pre-IPO prices represent 
an ideal opportunity for analyzing the quality of the information on firm value that is publicly avail-
able during the IPO process.  
The information revealed through pre-IPO trades is potentially relevant for underwriters, investors 
and issuers. Underwriters learn about the market’s assessment of the firm value and can set the fi-
nal offer price accordingly. Investors can use the information contained in the pre-IPO prices to 
discriminate between overpriced and underpriced issues. To the extent that the prices are indeed 
informative, uninformed investors can make their subscription decision contingent on the pre-IPO 
prices. Issuers, finally, are provided with a benchmark for the pricing proposal of their investment 
bank. This is of importance as investment banks may intentionally underprice stocks to reap the 
benefits of lower marketing costs or of high commissions paid by investors who seek preferential 
allocations of shares.
1  
In the present paper we use pre-issue trading prices for more than 350 German IPOs to investigate 
what is known about the firm’s value during the bookbuilding period. Our results can be summa-
rized as follows. The pre-IPO prices are highly informative. They are closer to the prices subse-
quently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer 
price. Pre-IPO prices also appear to be largely unbiased estimates of the subsequent exchange 
prices. Finally, the pre-IPO return (defined as the difference between the midpoint of the book-
building spread and the midpoint of the pre-IPO quotes on the day prior to the first exchange list-2 
ing) explains a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables like issue size, 
post-IPO volatility, and market momentum. Taken together, informational asymmetries during the 
offer period appear to be relatively low. Our study thus provides empirical support to Welch and 
Ritter (2002), who argue that asymmetric information is not the main driver of underpricing. 
We do not have knowledge of prior academic research on pre-IPO trading. In the U.S., when-
issued trading is common in conjunction with stock splits (see Angel, Brooks and Mathew (1997)), 
but, as in many other countries, it is illegal for IPOs.
2 Our work is related to previous research ana-
lyzing the price formation for newly listed issues. Barry and Jennings (1992) and Schultz and 
Zaman (1994) report that the initial return is almost entirely reflected in the opening price on the 
first trading day. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) analyze the quoting activity before the opening price 
on the first day of exchange trading is set and find that learning takes place in the pre-opening pe-
riod. Benveniste, Fu, Seguin and Yu (2000) analyze equity carve-outs. They find that the initial 
returns of the carved-out subsidiaries are related to the returns on the parent companies in the pre-
offer period. Due to the existence of pre-issue trading in Germany, we can extend this line of re-
search. We can analyze prices set during the entire bookbuilding period rather than only in the pre-
trading period on the first day of exchange trading, and our analysis is not confined to the special 
case of carve-outs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an overview of the German 
market for pre-issue trading. In section II we present our data set and some descriptive statistics. 
Section III analyzes the accuracy of the pre-IPO prices and their relation to underpricing. In Section 
IV we summarize our findings and discuss their implications.  
I.  Institutional Aspects of Pre-IPO Trading 
In Germany, special venues for trading new share issues before their first listing and, most impor-
tantly, during the subscription period, exist since the early 80s. This market segment is called Han-
del per Erscheinen and is one segment of the largely unregulated
3 „grey capital market“. In the pre-
sent paper we interchangeably use the terms pre-IPO, or pre-issue trading. 
This market segment has, for a long time, been rather small and restricted to banks and has not re-
ceived much attention. However, in the 1997-2000 hot IPO market the number of IPOs has reached 
unprecedented levels. Several large and well-marketed issues (like Deutsche Telekom AG and 
Infineon Technologies AG) and the success of the new market segment for growth companies 
                                                                                                                                                              
1   Cf. Baron and Holmström (1980), Baron (1982) and Loughran and Ritter (2001). 
2  This does not necessarily mean that pre-IPO trades, at least among banks, do not take place. For example, the 
Economic Times (February 8, 2000) reports on large activities in the informal grey market for IPOs in India.  
3  Recently there have been some proposals aiming at more stringent regulation (or even prohibition) of pre-issue 
trading.  3 
(Neuer Markt) have contributed to this IPO wave. Private investors have become increasingly in-
volved in the IPO market even though, as a consequence of high oversubscription rates, the odds of 
being allocated shares were not in favor of the average investor. This experience has brought the 
pre-IPO market to the attention of many investors. New trading platforms and the internet have also 
led to wider information dissemination and more price transparency. Bid and ask quotes are dis-
seminated via the large information vendors (REUTERS, Bloomberg) and the Internet.
4 Daily 
newspapers (e.g. FAZ and Börsenzeitung) often report these prices when reporting about ongoing 
IPOs. In addition, the Börsenzeitung publishes summary post-trade information each day (daily high 
and low prices, trading volume and 4 p.m. quotes).
5  We now describe the institutional aspects of 
the pre-IPO market in more detail.  
Trading „as if and when issued“ 
The trades in the pre-IPO market can be characterized as forward trades in shares that are in the 
process of going public. The transactions are contingent on the announced IPO taking place („if 
issued“) and are settled on the first trading day of the stock in the secondary market („when is-
sued“). In case the IPO is cancelled the pre-issue trades are undone. If the subscription period is 
extended by more than three days or if the bookbuilding price range is changed, all orders that have 
not yet been filled are cancelled. Otherwise all submitted orders are binding. Note that, contrary to 
other countries, a change of the bookbuilding range is very uncommon in Germany. Usually IPOs 
sold through the bookbuilding method have a binding upper bookbuilding price. Only recently did 
some offering prospecti allow for upward-adjustments of the bookbuilding range in response to 
changing overall market or specific demand conditions. There were, however, some cases where 
the final offer price was set below the lower bound of the bookbuilding range.  
Market organization 
                                                 
4  On the Internet this information is freely available on the websites of the broker-dealers themselves, the sites 
of the large online-brokers and on many IPO-forums including prominent sites like yahoo.de. Recently mobile 
communication devices like WAP mobile phones have been added to these information and ordering channels. 
In 2001 the brokerage firm Lang & Schwarz Wertpapierhandel AG has started a new trading platform in coop-
eration with a regional stock exchange (Düsseldorf) and an information vendor (VWD).  
5  Volume information is only available since June 2000. 4 
Several broker-dealers organize competing markets in pre-issue trading. They are supervised by 
the German Federal Securities Supervisory Office  (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapier-
handel). Until 1998 the pre-IPO market was a classical OTC market. Trading took place only via 
telephone, mainly between banks. Later, the quotes were made available to retail investors on the 
internet and through other information channels. Since summer 2000 the leading market participants 
have started – some in cooperation with large online-brokers – to implement online trading plat-
forms, which give all investors fast and simple access to market information and order submission.  
The two market leaders are the broker-dealers Börsenmakler Schnigge AG and Lang & Schwarz 
Wertpapierhandel AG (L&S).
6 Schnigge is the leading market maker for pre-issue trading. The 
company claims to have a market share of 80% (annual report 1999, p.14). Pre-IPO trading usually 
starts when the bookbuilding range and the exact timing of the issue (i.e., the subscription period 
and the day of the first exchange listing) are published. In Germany, this typically happens nine 
calendar days before the first listing.
7 First quotes are set after communication with market partici-
pants. Subsequently, quotes are adjusted in response to new information and demand and supply 
conditions. Pre-issue trading takes place from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. The last trading day is the day be-
fore the first listing on the exchange.  
Pre-IPO trading covers most issues that are subsequently listed on the various segments of the 
Frankfurt stock exchange. Brokers do not make a market in issues for which they or one of their 
cooperating partners act as underwriters. As an explanation for this abstinence, they mention poten-
tial conflicts of interest. Therefore, if our analysis reveals that the pre-IPO prices are informative, 
this is not because the underwriter is the market maker.  
Market Participants and Trading Motives 
Investors placing orders with the bookrunner may gain from underpricing when they are allocated 
shares. However, high oversubscription rates make this a rare event, especially when the issue is 
small. The pre-IPO market offers the opportunity to buy shares without bearing allocation uncer-
tainty. This is one motive for buyers.  
Investors who are confident to receive an allocation of shares may sell shares in the pre-IPO mar-
ket in order to lock in profits. Similarly, investors who already own shares can sell them in the pre-
IPO market as long as these shares are not subject to lockup restrictions. Finally, informed inves-
tors (and investors who believe that they are informed) may trade in the pre-IPO market in order to 
exploit their informational advantage.  
                                                 
6  Both are themselves listed companies and mention pre-IPO trading as being their most important business in 
terms of volume and profitability. Schnigge reports 5 million monthly page impressions on their web sites.  
7   See Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001) fur further institutional details of the German IPO market. 5 
II.  Data 
In our analysis we use quote and transaction data from the broker Börsenmakler Schnigge AG. Our 
raw data is from three different sources. First, Schnigge maintains a historical data base that con-
tains the last bid and ask quotes from the day before the IPO (i.e., the day before the stock is first 
traded on the exchange). From this data base we collected all quotes in the period from 03/30/98 to 
06/30/01. We refer to the resulting sample as the full sample. It covers 357 firms. Using quotation, 
rather than transaction, data is not an impediment to our analysis because our interest is in the in-
formation that is inferable from the pre-IPO market. None of our analyses assumes that trades have 
actually taken place at these prices.  
Börsenzeitung, a leading financial newspaper, started publishing daily Schnigge quotes (from 4.00 
p.m.) in April 2000. From June 2000 onwards, the published information was extended to include 
volume data. We collected this data from 04/17/00 through 06/30/2001. We refer to this sample as 
the daily sample. It covers 112 IPOs, for 86 of which we also have volume data. From 07/27/00 on 
we also recorded, at hourly intervals, the quotes published on Schnigge’s website. The hourly data 
are used for illustrative purposes only. The main analyses are conducted separately for the full 
sample and the daily sample.  
We restrict the analysis to stocks that went public on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. We obtained 
data on these IPOs (offer price, IPO volume, bookbuilding spread, first trading price, market seg-
ment) from the exchange. Data on secondary market prices and trading volumes is from Datastream. 
Out of the 400 stocks that went public on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange from 03/30/98 through 
06/30/01, Schnigge made a pre-IPO market in 357 issues.
8 306 of these companies chose to list on 
the Neuer Markt, the growth segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Table I presents descriptive 
statistics for these offerings and the quotes from the last day before the IPO. 
Insert Table I about here 
The average size of an issue is € 117.3 million, the median is € 39.1 million. The underpricing in 
the sample period was substantial. The average underpricing was 42.7%, the median was 13.3%. 
Only 10.1% of the issues were overpriced.  
As discussed in section  I, the pre-IPO market is a market maker market. The quoted bid-ask 
spreads are, as documented in Table I, rather wide, averaging 10.5%. However, given the uncer-
                                                 
8   Schnigge does not make a market if it is involved in the underwriting. It also appears that Schnigge refrained 
from making a market in issues with little investor interest. Consistent with this interpretation, issues not cov-
ered by Schnigge are smaller (the median issue volume is € 30.82 million vs. € 39.10 million for the full sam-
ple), less underpriced  (22.25% vs. 42.71%), and very seldom listed on the growth segment Neuer Markt (1.8% 
vs. 85.7%). 6 
tainty about the true value of the stock and the potentially high degree of informational asymmetry in 
IPOs, there may be good economic reasons for these wide spreads. We regress the spread on a set 
of explanatory variables to check whether the determination of the spread is in accordance with 
established theories of the bid-ask spread. Our explanatory variables are the log of the IPO volume 
as a proxy for firm size, the inverse of the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the width of the 
bookbuilding range (defined as the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the range, 
divided by its midpoint). The results are as follows (n = 357, R
2 = 0.17, t-statistics in parentheses):  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Spread11.180.725ln(Vol)35.331BB-Midpoint 0.023BB-Range
8.533.092.960.52
iiii =-++
  (1) 
As one would expect, the spreads are wider for smaller firms and are inversely related to the price 
level. The width of the bookbuilding range, which serves as a proxy for information asymmetry, 
has the expected positive sign but is insignificant.
9  
Price discovery should be associated with changing bid and ask quotes. We use the hourly data to 
analyze the frequency of quote changes. In 43.4% of all recorded cases, either the bid or the ask 
price or both changed from one hour to the next. For the IPOs for which we have information on 
daily volume (86 IPOs from June 2000 onwards), the mean daily volume as a percentage of shares 
issued is 0.48%. For the same 86 stocks, we compute the mean secondary market volume – again 
as a percentage of shares issued – on the 30
th day of exchange listing, which is 0.55%. The pre-IPO 
trading volume is thus of the same order of magnitude as the trading volume in the secondary mar-
ket. 
Figure 1 presents an example. It shows the evolution of the pre-IPO quotes for Linos AG, a com-
pany that went public on the Neuer Markt on September 1, 2000. The offer range was € 24 to € 27, 
the subscription period lasted from August 24 to August 30. Pre-IPO trading began on August 23 
(the day on which the offer range was announced) and lasted until August 31 (the day before the 
first listing on the exchange). The first pre-IPO bid prices were more than 30% above the upper 
end of the offer range. In the course of the subscription period, the quotes rose steadily. The quotes 
on the last day of pre-IPO trading were above € 50. The daily average trading volume was 9,450 
shares. This is equivalent to 0.68% of the issue volume. The offer price of € 27 was set at the up-
per end of the bookbuilding range. The first market price on September 1 was € 73. In this particu-
lar case, the pre-IPO quotes were thus considerably lower than the first market price, but they were 
also consistently closer to it than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. In 
addition, the difference between the pre-IPO quotes and the subsequent first market price de-
                                                 
9  We used the standard deviations of the returns of the 20 trading days after the IPO as an alternative measure of 
uncertainty. The results were similar.  7 
creased in the course of the pre-issue trading period. This is evidence of price discovery and in-
formation aggregation through pre-issue trading. The next section will reveal whether this picture is 
representative. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
III. Empirical Results 
We present our empirical results in three subsections. In the first we examine the accuracy and effi-
ciency of the prices set in the pre-issue period. We next analyze whether an (uninformed) investor 
can reduce winner's curse type of problems by conditioning his subscription decision on the pre-
IPO quotes. The third subsection complements the analysis by modeling fundamental determinants 
of IPO underpricing and pricing errors.  
III.A. Pricing Accuracy 
A first indication of the accuracy of the pre-IPO prices is the frequency with which the first market 
price on the exchange falls within the last pre-IPO quotes. We find this to be the case for 52.9% of 
the IPOs in our sample. In contrast, only 26.9% of the first exchange prices are inside the book-
building range.
10  
To assess the accuracy of the pre-IPO quotes in more detail we examine the percentage difference 
between the first market price and the prices set during pre-IPO trading. We define the pricing er-
ror as:
 11  
 
,
,
PricingError
iij
ij
Pp
p
-
=   (2) 
where Pi is the first exchange price of stock i, and pi,j is a pre-IPO price quoted for stock i at stage j 
of the offer period. We take the pre-IPO prices to be the average of the quoted bid and the quoted 
ask price. For the full sample, we only have quotes from the last day before the IPO. For the daily 
sample, we calculate variants of the pricing error based upon prices quoted on the day before the 
subscription period, on the first and last day of the subscription period, halfway through the sub-
scription period, and on the day before trading on the exchange starts.
12 In 30 cases, pre-issue trad-
                                                 
10  In 86.9% of the cases the percentage bookbuilding range is wider than the last pre-IPO spread. The results re-
ported in the text are thus not driven by excessively wide spreads.  
11  We also use logarithmic pricing errors. The results are similar and are, therefore, not discussed in the text. The 
appendix contains a table with descriptive statistics based on logarithmic pricing errors.  
12  If the subscription period extends over an even number of trading days, we take the midpoint to be the day that is 
closer to the beginning of the subscription period. Finally, there are some cases where the subscription period 8 
ing commenced only at the first day of the subscription period. For the quotes from the day before 
the subscription period the number of observations thus reduces from 112 to 82. In order to gauge 
the magnitude of the  pre-IPO pricing error we use the pricing errors defined relative to, first, the 
midpoint of the bookbuilding range and, second, the offer price as benchmarks. For the offer price, 
the pricing error definition coincides with the usual definition of underpricing, i.e. (first exchange 
price / offer price – 1). 
Insert Table II about here 
Table II presents descriptive statistics on the pricing errors. The results for the full sample are 
shown in Panel A. The mean pricing errors are 49.4% for the midpoint of the bookbuilding range 
and 42.7% for the offer price. The first official price set on the exchange is thus more than 40% 
higher than the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. By contrast, the last pre-IPO 
price is, on average, almost equal to the first price on the exchange. The mean pricing error is only 
0.6%, which is not significantly different from zero (t-value 0.76, z-value for a Wilcoxon test 
1.58). The standard deviations show that the pre-IPO prices are not only less biased, but also more 
efficient estimates of the first market price than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the 
offer price. For the bookbuilding range midpoint and the offer price, the standard deviations of the 
pricing errors are 77.5% and 69.00%, respectively, more than four times larger than the corre-
sponding figure for the pre-IPO quotes (15.74%). In the light of this, the gain in accuracy that the 
offer price achieves relative to the offer range midpoint appears to be small.  
The results are not due to outliers. We reestimate the standard deviation using a winsorized sam-
ple. We replace the 5% largest and smallest observation with the 95% and 5% quantile of the dis-
tribution, respectively. After winsorization, the standard deviation of the pricing errors is 55.40% 
for the offer price, and 11.23% for the pre-IPO quotes.  
The pricing error of the pre-IPO quotes is essentially an overnight return, namely, the return from 
the pre-IPO quote midpoint on the last day before exchange trading starts to the first transaction 
price established on the exchange. The reported values (11.23%  and  15.74% with and without 
winsorization, respectively) appear to be high for the standard deviation of a cross-section of 
overnight returns. To put the results into perspective, we compute the cross-sectional standard de-
viation of close-to-close returns from the first trading day to the second. It is 13.20%, indicating 
that the standard deviation of the pricing error of pre-IPO quotes is similar to the volatility of post-
IPO exchange prices.
13  
                                                                                                                                                              
ended one day before the first official listing. In these cases the pre-issue prices from the last day of the sub-
scription period and from the last day of pre-IPO trading are identical.  
13   The pricing errors of the offer price and the last pre-IPO price are correlated (the correlation coefficient is 
0.4426). This finding may be explained by the arrival of new information after the end of pre-IPO trading. This 
is best seen by examining logarithmic pricing errors (See Table A1 in the appendix). Their correlation is 9 
Insert Table III about here 
So far, we described differences in accuracy without testing for their statistical significance. We 
conduct paired t-tests as well as Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests to test the null hypothe-
sis of no difference between absolute pricing errors of pre-IPO quotes on the one hand, and those 
of the offer range midpoint and the offer price on the other hand (cf. Table III). In each test, the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 0.1% level or better. To sum up, the results indicate that, first, pre-IPO 
quotes are significantly more informative than the bookbuilding range and the offer price and, sec-
ond, that pre-IPO quotes are good proxies for the prices set on the first trading day on the exchange.  
Moving on to the daily sample, a similar picture emerges. As for the full sample, Table II contains 
the descriptive statistics, while Table III presents tests for differences in absolute pricing errors. 
The last pre-IPO quotes are, again, significantly more accurate than the offer price. Intriguingly, 
quotes set on the day before the start of the subscription period are significantly more accurate than 
the offer range midpoint, and as accurate as the offer price. During the bookbuilding period, the 
pricing accuracy steadily increases, that is, the quality of the information available to market par-
ticipants rises over time. Further tests (not reported in Table III) show that the absolute pricing 
errors from the last day of bookbuilding are significantly (0.1% or better) lower than the ones from 
the first day of the bookbuilding period.  
If pre-IPO prices rationally incorporate available information they should be unbiased estimators 
of the true value of the stock. This can be tested by running the following regression:
14 
  ., ijjijij Pp abe =++   (3) 
i P is the “true” price and  , ij p  is an estimate of the true price. Unbiasedness implies  0 j a =  and 
1 j b = . We take the first price set on the exchange to be a valid proxy for the true price.
15 In our 
alternative regressions,  , ij p  is taken to be pre-IPO quotes from various stages of the offer period, 
the midpoint of the bookbuilding range, and the offer price, respectively. Given the descriptive 
statistics discussed above we expect only pre-IPO quotes to be unbiased predictors of the true 
price.  
Insert Table IV about here 
                                                                                                                                                              
0.4379. Assume that the log difference between the first market price and the pre-IPO quote is solely due to 
overnight innovation. From Table A.1, the innovation would then have a standard deviation of 16.07%. If this in-
novation were the only source of correlation between the pricing errors, then the correlation would equal 
0.1607² / (0.1607 × 0.3761) = 0.4273, little less than the observed correlation.  
14  To reduce the impact of heteroscedasticity on the efficiency of the coefficient estimates, we exclude one ob-
servation (the IPO of Deutsche Börse AG) from the regression because prices were much larger than those of 
the other IPOs. (The offer price was € 335 compared to € 54 for the IPO with the second highest offer price.)  
15  See, among others, Rock (1986) for a justification of this assumption.  10 
The results are shown in Table IV. For the full sample (see Panel A), they are fully consistent with 
our prior expectations. The final pre-IPO quotes are unbiased estimators of the true price (i.e., the 
joint null hypothesis  0 j a =  and  1 j b =  is not rejected) whereas the midpoint of the bookbuilding 
range and the offer price are not. This also holds for the daily sample (see Panel B). Unbiasedness 
is rejected, however, until (and including) the midpoint of the subscription period. Pre-IPO prices 
appear to be unbiased estimates of the first price established on the exchange only in the second 
half of the subscription period.   
III.B. Pre-IPO Quotes and the Winner's Curse 
The daily sample also sheds some light on the usefulness of pre-IPO quotes for uninformed inves-
tors who are unsure whether to subscribe to an issue or not. These investors will be concerned 
about suffering from the winner's curse, i.e., being allocated overpriced shares. General statements 
on the magnitude of the winner’s curse are difficult to derive as it depends on the allocation 
mechanism and the subscription strategy.  
We examine the performance of the following feasible strategy: Subscribe to an IPO whenever the 
pre-IPO bid price on the first day of the offer period is strictly larger than the upper bound of the 
offer range. In the daily sample, the mean underpricing is 19.1%. 15.2% of all issues are over-
priced, i.e., the first market price is strictly smaller than the offer price. An investor following the 
strategy outlined above would have subscribed to 69 out of the 112 IPOs contained in the daily 
sample. The mean underpricing of these 69 IPOs is 30.4%, and only seven of them (10.1%) are 
overpriced. Thus, following the strategy substantially increases the average initial return and re-
duces the percentage of overpriced issues. The average underpricing of the 43 IPOs the investor 
would not have subscribed to is only 1.1%, and 23.3% of these issues are overpriced. We define 
two binary variables indicating whether an issue is overpriced or not, and whether an investor fol-
lowing the strategy would have subscribed to it or not. A chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis 
of independence at the 10% level (p-value 0.06).  
These results suggest that winner’s curse type of problems can be substantially reduced by condi-
tioning the subscription decision on information available on the first day of the subscription pe-
riod.  
III.C. Multivariate Analysis 
Most underpricing theories argue that underpricing is a rational answer to informational asymme-
tries. They also predict that the magnitude of the underpricing varies cross-sectionally. Hosts of 
empirical papers have uncovered variables that help to explain this variation (see Wasserfallen 
and Wittleder (1994) and Ljungqvist (1997) for research on the German IPO market). When com-11 
paring the pricing errors of offer prices and pre-IPO quotes, we should take into account the fact 
that a portion of the underpricing is explainable.  
Specifically, we wish to analyze whether the pre-IPO prices contain information that is not already 
contained in those variables that have proven to have explanatory power for the magnitude of the 
underpricing. We use the following variables:
16  
•  the natural logarithm of the issue volume,  
•  the standard deviation of daily returns in the 20 trading days after completion of the IPO as a 
proxy for the uncertainty about the true value of the stock,
17  
•  the return of an appropriate stock index in the 60 days prior to the subscription period. We in-
clude this variable because a strong positive relation between underpricing and the market re-
turn prior to the issue has been documented for Germany by Ljungqvist (1997). For firms that 
went public on the Neuer Markt we use the NEMAX All Share index, for firms listed on other 
segments of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we use the CDAX index. Both indices are broad, 
value-weighted performance indices published by the exchange. 
•  the index return during the subscription period. We include this variable because the German 
practice of not adjusting the bookbuilding range limits the ability of underwriters to adjust the 
offer price to general market movements during the offer period.  
The results of the cross-sectional regressions (based on the full sample) are shown in Table V, 
starting with a regression in which underpricing is the dependent variable. First day returns appear 
to be lower for larger issues, and they are strongly positively related to the index returns prior to, 
and during, the subscription period. The coefficient on the secondary market volatility is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. The independent variables explain 32% of the variation in the un-
derpricing. The standard error of the regression is 56.7%, which is still more than three times as 
large as the standard deviation of the pre-IPO quotes’ pricing error (15.74%). This already indi-
cates that the pre-IPO prices contain information beyond that contained in the variables that are 
usually included in underpricing regressions. 
Insert Table V about here 
This conclusion is strongly confirmed when we add the pre-IPO return as an additional explanatory 
variable. It is defined as  
                                                 
16  Our conclusions do not change when we also include the price revision, which we define as the percentage dif-
ference between the offer price and the offer range midpoint, or a dummy variable for listings on the growth 
segment Neuer Markt. Including these two variables in the underpricing regression (first row in Table V) 
reduces the standard error of the regression only slightly from 56.7% to 56.1%. 12 
 
Midpointofpre-IPOquotes
1
MidpointofBookbuildingrange
-   (4) 
The pre-IPO quotes are from the day before the first day of exchange trading. The variable captures 
the difference between the market’s assessment of the fair price and the unconditional price expec-
tation of the underwriter, which is proxied by the midpoint of the bookbuilding range. If, for what-
ever reasons, underwriters do not fully adapt offer prices to the market assessment, the variable 
should explain the observed underpricing.  
Inclusion of the pre-IPO return changes the regression results dramatically. The R
2 jumps from 0.32 
to 0.81. The return standard deviation and the index returns do no longer have explanatory power 
for the underpricing. Only the IPO volume retains its significance. Including only the pre-IPO return 
on the right-hand side yields an R
2 of 0.80. Again, the results are not driven by outliers. The robust 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between underpricing and pre-IPO returns is 0.883, little 
less than the Pearson correlation (0.897). The predictive power of pre-IPO quotes is considerably 
larger than the one documented in Benveniste, Fu, Seguin and Yu (2000). In their study on equity 
carve-outs, the rank correlation between the market return of the parent company during the offer 
period and the subsequent underpricing of the subsidiary is 0.36.  
A different, though related, question is whether those variables that are usually found to explain the 
underpricing do also have explanatory power for the pre-IPO pricing error. As before, this pricing 
error is defined as  
 
Firstexchangeprice
1
Midpointofpre-IPOquotes
-   (5) 
The results, also shown in Table V, reveal that the independent variables explain only a small frac-
tion of the variation in the pre-IPO pricing error. The R
2 is 0.025. Only the return volatility in the 
secondary market has explanatory power. Pre-IPO quotes tend to be too low for IPOs with a high 
volatility.
18 The other explanatory variables are insignificant.  
In a final step we analyze whether the absolute value of the pre-IPO pricing error is explained by 
the same set of independent variables. The two variables that enter the regression significantly are 
the secondary market volatility and the index return prior to the IPO. The pre-IPO quotes are less 
precise the higher the secondary market volatility To the extent that secondary market volatility is a 
valid proxy for uncertainty during the pre-IPO period, this is what one should expect to observe. 
                                                                                                                                                              
17  Using the percentage bookbuilding range as an alternative measure of the uncertainty leaves the conclusions 
unchanged.  
18  Note that this does not entail a violation of market efficiency for two reasons. First, transaction costs are sub-
stantial (the average spread is, as shown in Table I, 10.5%). Second, the standard deviation is calculated from re-
turns in the secondary market and is, therefore, not observable during the subscription period.  13 
The observation that absolute pricing errors increase with the market return prior to the IPO con-
firms the view that in a bull market, investor interest is expected but hard to predict (cf. Derrien 
and Womack, 2000).  
IV. Summary and conclusions 
In the present paper we exploit a special feature of the German capital market, namely, the exis-
tence of an active market for pre-issue trades in IPOs. This allows us to observe market prices for 
IPOs already during the subscription period. The information impounded in these prices is poten-
tially relevant for underwriters, issuers, and investors. Both the underwriter and the issuer can 
make use of that knowledge when negotiating the offer price. Private investors can use the informa-
tion in the pre-IPO prices to condition their subscription decision, and thereby avoid subscribing to 
overpriced issues.  
Our analysis yields the conclusion that the pre-IPO prices are indeed highly informative. They are, 
on average, very close to the price subsequently established on the exchange, much closer than both 
the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. Since the final pre-IPO prices are 
largely unbiased estimates of the subsequent exchange prices, there is little indication that they are 
affected by investor irrationality or price manipulation. Finally, the pre-IPO return (defined as the 
“return” between the midpoint of the bookbuilding spread and the midpoint of the IPO quotes on the 
day prior to the first exchange listing) explains a large part of the underpricing that is left unex-
plained by market momentum and other observable variables. 
The results imply that information asymmetries and valuation uncertainty are much lower than the 
observed variance of underpricing suggests. This provides empirical support for the conjecture of 
Welch and Ritter (2002) that asymmetric information cannot explain the recently observed high 
levels of underpricing. Any informational disadvantage of uninformed investors, for instance, is 
largely reduced because they can monitor the pre-IPO prices and condition their subscription deci-
sion on that information. They can thereby alleviate, or even eliminate, the winner’s curse problem. 
In the presence of a pre-IPO market that efficiently aggregates private information, the winner’s 
curse does not provide a valid explanation for underpricing.  
In information acquisition models (Benveniste and Spindt (1989)), underpricing rewards informed 
investors for revealing their information during the bookbuilding process. Previous empirical stud-
ies (e.g. Hanley (1993), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001) and Cornelli and Goldreich (2001)) find 
support for this hypothesis. They show that investors who provide information benefit from under-
pricing. They do, however, not quantify the extent to which the underpricing can be explained 
through the Benveniste-Spindt argument. Qualitatively, our results also appear to be consistent with 
the information production hypothesis. Information production could, together with information 
leakages, explain the finding that pricing errors of pre-IPO quotes decrease in the course of the 14 
bookbuilding. However, if the goal of the bookbuilding is to elicit as much information as possible 
and, subject to incentive constraints, incorporate it into the offer price, one should expect offer 
prices to be more accurate than pre-IPO quotes observed early during the subscription period. As 
our empirical evidence suggests otherwise, it appears that either the value of information produced 
through bookbuilding is small, or underwriters are inflexible in responding to this information. The 
Benveniste-Spindt argument thus does not seem to provide a sufficient explanation for the observed 
magnitude of underpricing.  
The signaling explanation for underpricing is consistent with the evidence. In a separating equilib-
rium, investors infer the firm value from the issuer’s behavior, such that pre-IPO prices should be 
good predictors of the first market prices. The signaling theory has, however, not received much 
support in previous empirical studies (e.g. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) and Michaely 
and Shaw (1994)).  
Finally, if underpricing is used as a means of creating excess demand, be it to achieve a preferred 
ownership structure or to serve the banks’ interests, issuers and underwriters should welcome an 
efficient pre-IPO market. With risk averse investors, the less uncertain investors are about the true 
price, the less underpricing is needed to create a given excess demand. Taken together, our evi-
dence thus corroborates the recommendation of Welch and Ritter (2002) that underpricing research 
should concentrate on agency conflicts and allocation issues. 
Another set of implications pertains to the design of the selling procedure. Our evidence suggests 
that the offer price does not incorporate all available information. There are several ways in which 
the bookbuilding procedure could be adapted in order to make better use of available information. 
The bookbuilding range could be set based on observed pre-IPO prices, and changes of the range 
could be made in response to the development of these prices. In addition, underwriters could in-
crease the width of the range to increase pricing flexibility. Practitioners sometimes argue that a 
narrow offer range is necessary to prevent winner’s curse type of problems.
19 As shown in this 
paper, however, pre-IPO trading can drastically reduce investor uncertainty so that this argument 
loses appeal.  
These suggestions presuppose the existence of an efficient market for pre-IPO trading. The German 
example shows that such a market is feasible. Of course, if the pre-IPO market were to influence 
the setting of the offer price more directly, the incentive to manipulate prices would be increased. 
However, even in the present form in which pre-IPO trading is not directly linked to the selling and 
                                                 
19  The argument is as follows. Private investors (who are supposed to be uninformed) usually submit unlimted 
orders. They thus run the risk of being allocated shares at a price equaling the upper bound of the bookbuilding 
range even if that price is above the “true” price. If the bookbuilding spread is wide, this risk is aggravated.  15 
underwriting process, the advantages that a pre-IPO market entails for investors, issuers and un-
derwriters appear to be substantial.  16 
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Figure 1: Pre-issue trading of LINOS AG 
Linos AG went public on September 1, 2000 at an offer price of € 27. The first price established on the exchange 
was € 73. The offer range was € 24 to € 27, the subscription period lasted from August 24 to August 30. Pre-IPO 
trading began on the day of the announcement of the offer range (August 23) and lasted until August 31. The shown 
pre-IPO bid and ask prices were recorded at full hours. 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample (357 IPOs from 03/30/98 to 06/30/01) 
Underpricing is defined as (first price on the exchange / offer price – 1). The width of the bookbuilding range is 
defined as 2 · (upper bound – lower bound) / (upper bound + lower bound). Similarly, the width of the pre-IPO 
quotes is defined as 2 · (ask – bid) / (ask + bid).  
 
  Mean  Median  Standard deviation 
IPO volume (million €)  117.32  39.10  465.96 
Underpricing (%)  42.71  13.33  69.00 
Width of bookbuilding range (%)  17.75  16.99  5.58 
Width of last pre-IPO spread (%)  10.45  10.00  4.24 
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics for Pricing Errors (in %) 
The pricing error is defined as  
j i
j i i
p
p P
,
, Error   Pricing
-
=
 
where Pi is the first trading price and pi,j is as defined in the first column. The t-value in the third column is for a 
test of the null hypothesis of a zero mean. In the winsorization, extreme observations are pulled to the variable’s 
5% and 95% quantiles, respectively.   
For the quotes from the last day before the subscription period the number of observations reduces to 82 as trading 
did not commence at this stage in some cases. For this sample of 82 IPOs, the standard deviation of the pricing 
errors based on offer range midpoints and offer prices is 48.3 and 39.9, respectively. 
 
Quantiles   
 
 
Mean 
 
t-value 
 
Std. Dev 
Std. dev. (after 
winsorization)  25%   50%  75%  
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=357)               
Midpoint of offer range  49.44  12.05  77.52  64.21  0.00  20.69  73.68 
Offer price  42.71  11.70  69.00  55.40  1.09  13.33  60.26 
Last pre-IPO quotes  0.64  0.76  15.74  11.23  -6.47  -1.58  4.58 
               
Panel B: Daily Sample 
(NOB=112) 
             
Midpoint of offer range  19.34  4.46  45.90  39.08 
-
10.28 
10.73  32.8 
Offer price  19.15  5.48  36.95  30.23  0.00  5.00  22.7 
Pre-IPO quotes from               
  Day before subscription period   -5.13  -1.67  27.83  23.25 
-
23.50 
-8.25  5.2 
  First day of subscription period  -9.48  -4.06  24.72  20.38 
-
24.42 
-
12.41 
0.3 
  Midpoint of subscription period  -7.80  -4.06  20.37  18.46 
-
20.00 
-8.10  1.5 
  Last day of subscription period  -4.26  -2.50  18.07  14.78 
-
15.18 
-5.15  1.1 27 
  Last day of pre-IPO trading   -2.54  -2.00  13.48  8.96  -8.76  -4.84  0.0 
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Table III: Testing Differences between Absolute Pricing Errors (in %) 
Using paired t-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, we test the significance of mean differences 
between absolute pricing errors. These are defined as  
j i
j i i
p
p P
,
, Error   Pricing    Absolute
-
=  
where Pi is the first trading price and pi,j is a price indication available prior to the exchange listing. Table entries 
are test statistics for the null hypothesis of zero difference between the absolute pricing errors of the prices de-
fined in the column and row headers, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. For the quotes from the day before 
the subscription period the number of observations reduces to 82. 
  Midpoint of offer range  Offer price 
  t-test  Wilcoxon  t-test  Wilcoxon 
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=357)         
Last pre-IPO quotes  12.34 (0.000)  14.86 (0.000)  10.46 (0.000)  10.87 (0.000) 
Panel B: Daily Sample 
(NOB=112) 
       
Pre-IPO quotes from         
  Day before subscription period   3.57 (0.001)  2.42 (0.016)  -0.51 (0.613)  1.03 (0.306) 
  First day of subscription period  3.51 (0.001)  2.11 (0.035)  -0.97 (0.330)  0.67 (0.505) 
  Midpoint of subscription period  4.78 (0.000)  3.62 (0.000)  0.09 (0.938)  1.87 (0.064) 
  Last day of subscription period  5.94 (0.000)  6.18 (0.000)  1.50 (0.133)  3.15 (0.002) 
  Last day of pre-IPO trading   7.37 (0.000)  8.04 (0.000)  3.25 (0.001)  4.63 (0.000) 29 
Table IV: Unbiasedness 
The Table shows the results of the regression 
., ijjijij Pp abe =++  
where  i P  is the first price set on the exchange and  j i p ,  is as defined in the first column. t-statistics (in parenthe-
ses) are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The last column shows the p-value for a 
Wald test of the joint null hypothesis  0;1 jj ab == .  
In both panels one observation (the IPO of Deutsche Börse AG) has been excluded. The prices were much larger 
than those of the other IPOs (offer price € 335 and first price on the exchange € 362, compared to € 54 and € 73, 
respectively, for the IPO with the second highest offer price). For the quotes from the last day before the subscrip-
tion period the number of observations is reduced to 81 as trading in some IPOs did not commence at this early 
stage. 
 
  j a   j b   R
2 
p-value for H0: 
0;1 jj ab ==  
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=356)         
midpoint of offer range  -1.753 
(-0.33) 
1.678 
(7.37)  0.666  0.000 
offer price  -1.410 
(-0.26) 
1.591 
(7.24)  0.683  0.000 
last pre-IPO price  -0.786 
(-1.08) 
1.035 
(43.75)  0.968  0.290 
Panel B: Daily Sample (NOB=111)         
midpoint of offer range  -2.36 
(-1.20) 
1.38 
(14.35)  0.651  0.000 
offer price  -2.13 
(-1.28) 
1.36 
(17.05)  0.725  0.000 
Pre-IPO quotes from         
  Day before subscription period   -3.78 
(-2.11) 
1.16 
(12.01)  0.806  0.059 
  First day of subscription period  -1.40 
(-0.88) 
0.99 
(11.79)  0.781  0.008 
  Midpoint of subscription period  -1.72 
(-1.34) 
1.02 
(14.46)  0.852  0.002 
  Last day of subscription period  -0.661 
(-0.67) 
1.00 
(17.39)  0.880  0.140 
  Last day of pre-IPO trading   -1.26 
(-1.50) 
1.05 
(21.56)  0.933  0.125 
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Table V: Pre-IPO trading and underpricing 
The Table shows the results of regressions of a measure of underpricing and the pricing errors in the pre-IPO trad-
ing on variables that, based on previous research, are considered to have explanatory power for the magnitude of the 
underpricing. We include the natural logarithm of the issue volume, the secondary market volatility in the 20 days 
following the IPO, and the return on an appropriate stock index, computed separately for the 60 days prior to the 
offer period and for the offer period.  
Underpricing is defined as (first price on the exchange / offer price – 1). The pre-IPO return is defined as (mid-
point of the last pre-IPO quotes / midpoint of the bookbuilding range – 1). The pricing error of the last pre-IPO 
price is (first price on the exchange / midpoint of the last pre-IPO quotes – 1). T-statistics (in parentheses) are 
calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 
Dependent va-
riable  constant  log(volume
) 
secondary 
market  
volatility 
index return 
prior to 
offer period 
index return 
during offer 
period 
pre-IPO 
return  adj. R
2 
underpricing  0.231 
(1.97) 
-0.028 
(-1.16) 
4.537 
(5.34) 
1.051 
(6.12) 
2.216 
(4.68) 
  0.324 
underpricing  0.097 
(1.66) 
-0.033 
(2.55) 
0.713 
(1.46) 
-0.059 
(-0.72) 
0.302 
(0.94) 
0.883 
(16.32) 
0.807 
underpricing  0.003 
(0.16)          0.886 
(18.80)  0.804 
pricing error last 
pre-IPO price 
0.013 
(0.48) 
-0.009 
(-1.46) 
0.580 
(3.02) 
-0.034 
(-0.86) 
0.282 
(1.51)    0.025 
| pricing error last 
pre-IPO price | 
0.074 
(3.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
0.425 
(2.71) 
0.077 
(-2.79) 
0.158 
(1.05)    0.052 
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APPENDIX  
Table AI: Descriptive Statistics for Logarithmic Pricing Errors (in %) 
The pricing error is defined as  
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
=
j i
i
p
P
,
ln Error   Pricing  
where Pi is the first trading price and pi,j is as defined in the first column. The t-value in the third column is for a 
test of the null hypothesis of a zero mean. In the winsorization, extreme observations are pulled to the variable’s 
5% and 95% quantiles, respectively. For the quotes from the last day before the subscription period the number of 
observations reduces to 82 as trading did not commence at this stage in some cases. For this sample of 82 IPOs, 
the standard deviation of the pricing errors based on offer range midpoints and offer prices is 34.40 and 26.68, 
respectively. 
 
Quantiles   
 
 
Mean 
 
t-value 
 
Std. Dev 
Std. dev. (after 
winsorization)  25%   50%  75%  
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=357)               
Midpoint of offer range  30.31  13.69  41.83  38.28  0.00  18.81  55.21 
Offer price  27.37  13.75  37.61  33.74  1.08  12.52  47.16 
Last pre-IPO quotes  -0.59  -0.69  16.07  10.79  -6.69  -1.59  4.47 
               
Panel B: Daily Sample 
(NOB=112) 
             
Midpoint of offer range  11.65  3.66  33.68  30.35 
-
10.85 
10.19  28.4 
Offer price  13.94  5.85  25.22  22.36  0.00  4.88  20.5 
Pre-IPO quotes from               
  Day before subscription period   -9.08  -3.01  27.31  24.18 
-
26.79 
-8.62  5.1 
  First day of subscription period  -13.15  -5.62  24.77  21.97 
-
28.00 
-
13.26 
0.3 32 
  Midpoint of subscription period  -10.42  -5.15  21.41  19.66 
-
22.31 
-8.44  1.5 
  Last day of subscription period  -5.94  -3.58  17.58  14.89 
-
16.47 
-5.29  1.1 
  Last day of pre-IPO trading   -3.38  -2.91  12.27  9.13  -9.17  -4.96  0.0 
 